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ABSTRACT 
 Consequentiality, affect, and rehearsal are also important components that help contribute 
to the recall of autobiographical memories.  Traditionally, these features have been assessed in 
public dramatic events in the past such as the Challenger explosion and the 9/11 terrorist attack.  
In opposition to these traditionally studied events, the present study examined the effects of these 
features on five different private events.  An analysis of these different experiences was assessed 
to determine the role of consequentiality, affect, and rehearsal play on memory recall.  These 
three components were assessed in five different events during different points of the lifetime.  
Adults diagnosed with a cancer diagnosis (N = 44) were examined and compared to adults who 
heard about their child’s injury (N = 63, Hillman et al., 2010), adults who viewed their child’s 
injury (N = 37 Hillman et al., 2010), adults who experienced a car accident (N = 74, Shaneyfelt, 
Minor, & Bohannon, 2008), and adults who experienced an injury during their childhood (N = 
109, Hillman et al., 2010).  All of these events were measures with a two part survey that 
consisted of a free recall narrative of the event and a detailed series of proved questions which 
included ratings of vividness, affect, and an estimate of rehearsals.  Cancer diagnosis memories 
yielded the highest memory detail and recounts, but the lowest vividness ratings.  This finding 
sheds light on how the method of information input plays different roles in both memory quality 
and quantity.   
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Chronic, Lethal Versus Acute, Non-lethal Threats: A Look inside the Memories of Cancer 
Patients at the Time of Their Diagnosis 
Daily life is routine to people; a passive process that they live through without much 
thought.  That is, unless, something unexpected and arousing takes place.  An event like this, 
such as the assassination of JFK, may cause a special type of memory to be formed; this type of 
memory is called a flashbulb memory, which is more comprehensive and vivid than memories 
from daily life (Brown & Kulik, 1977).  Arousal can be any elevated state of emotion such as 
anger, sorrow, surprise, etc.  Due to the arousing circumstances that surround these types of 
memories, it allows the memory to be encoded more comprehensively, and is therefore easier to 
recall (Christianson, 1989).  These emotions enable these memories to be more impressive than 
neutral events (Julian, Bohannon, & Aue, 2009).  Memories for stimuli and events which can be 
considered emotional have been found to be both more vivid and more accurate than those of 
neutral stimuli (Todd, Talmi, Schmitz, Susskind, & Anderson, 2012; Labar & Cabeza, 2006).  
Since an arousing state is one of the main focuses of flashbulb memories, there is much research 
in this area which deals with traumatic public events such as The Challenger Explosion, and the 
JFK assassination as mentioned above (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Neisser 
et. al 1996).  Although, it should be noted that emotionally private events have also shown 
similar characteristics of flashbulb memories due to arousal, and therefore these memories are 
more vividly remembered as well (Rubin & Kozin, 1984).  Alternatively, other researchers have 
debated that even though these memories are formed in a different set of circumstances, they are 
no different than the memories that are formed every day (Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  However, 
the majority of research has shown evidence that these flashbulb memories are distinct from 
memories formed on a day to day basis. 
4 
 
 There has been limited research on memories of cancer patients at the time of their 
diagnosis.  Furthermore, there has been no fixed research that has analyzed the flashbulb-like 
qualities of discovering one’s own cancer diagnosis.  With a cancer diagnosis being potentially 
life threatening, these memories can be considered private, traumatic events.  Autobiographical 
memories can be pertinent to one’s survival, therefore causing the memory to be enhanced.  
Nairne and Pandeirada (2008) proposed that since memory has evolved over time in order to 
better reproductive fitness, memory systems have paralleled this evolution by focusing on 
retaining information that is fitness related.  The large majority of women who were part of a 
study which focused on the medical treatment and satisfaction from their diagnostic consultation 
throughout their cancer care, stated that their diagnostic consultation was a highly memorable 
event, with none of them indicating poor recollection of the memory (Mager & Andrykowski, 
2002).  This event can also have the element of surprise if the individual had no preceding 
medical conditions or indications that they might have a critical illness.  With the diagnosis of 
cancer, there are also the long-term effects of treatment such as medications, chemotherapy, 
radiation, and/or surgery.  Depending on the severity of the disease, this makes the diagnosis 
both acutely and chronically life changing. 
Two studies that attempted to study the flashbulb memory aspect of private, traumatic 
events were used to compare to the obtained data from the current study.  These studies have 
different arousal and consequentiality components than cancer diagnoses, and consisted of 
childhood injuries that resulted in a hospital visit and car accident memories where the driver had 
no anticipation of the event.  Memories regarding childhood injury were an important 
comparison because it addressed an acute, non-life-threatening event.  These events were 
extremely emotional for the individuals as a child so the arousal aspect of these memories is 
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present.  Due to this high emotionality at the time of encoding, the needed parallel for 
comparison of these memories to cancer diagnosis memories is present.  The parent’s memory of 
their child’s injury was also taken into account, with the parent having to have been present at 
the time of the injury or told verbally about the injury.  Most childhood injuries result from 
falling, and often only produce scrapes or broken bones, which do not have serious, chronic 
consequences (Hillard, 2008).  Memories from car accidents also have the high arousal 
component, and have the potential to be acutely lethal or non-lethal.  Again, this high arousal 
component at the time of encoding is crucial for the overall comparison that the current study 
intends to make with cancer diagnoses. 
 
Encoding Factors 
 Episodic memory is currently defined as an autobiographical memory according to 
Tulving (1972).  It has also been referred to in other ways such as later collective memory 
(Brewer, 1996) and personal memory (Brewer, 1986).  Tulving (1985) defined remembering as 
the awareness or consciousness of a particular event that is integrated into an individual’s past 
experiences.  Flashbulb memories are indeed an instance of remembering; however, there are 
two views of these special memories that are controversial to one another.  The first view states 
that the emotions at the time of encoding are of the utmost importance; on the other hand, the 
second view insists that perceptual vividness is reconstructed at the time of recall, which can 
undermine accuracy (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  Numerous studies have 
designated certain features that are necessary for the appropriate encoding to take place at the 
time of the event (Conway, 1995; Gold, 1992).  Rehearsal, consequentiality, and affect have 
been shown to be other crucial components of a flashbulb memory.  Contextual features can also 
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act as powerful retrieval cues for the target information (Godden & Baddeley, 1975).  The 
current study focuses not only on the absence and presence of these features, but also the short-
term versus long-term aspect of the event’s consequentiality. 
 
Rehearsal 
 Rehearsal is defined as the number of times that an individual repeats the story of the 
memory to either another individual or an audience.  Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) proposed 
a retrieval model that is based around the idea that the retrieval of certain information from an 
individual’s memory is strongly influenced by the desire to reconstruct those memories in a way 
that fits into one’s future goals, expectations, and ideal self-image.  In other words, 
autobiographical memories are needed for an individual to justify his or her future goals, based 
upon pre-existing memories (Conway & Tacchi, 1996).   
Another retrieval based model proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) is the dual-
storage model, which indicates that when a memory is retrieved, it could emerge from either 
long-term or short-term memory storage.  While long-term memory was found to be a more 
enduring option for memories, short-term memory was only temporary but also more readily 
available.   A “U-shaped” serial position curve demonstrates memory, with a strong positive 
correlation between the number of rehearsals and the probability of later recall (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1968).  Similarly, Rundus (1970) found that as the number of rehearsals increased so 
did the strength of the memory in the long-term memory storage. 
In support of Rundus’ findings in 1970, Brown & Kulik (1977) also found a positive 
correlation between the number of rehearsals and memory elaboration.  This study looked at nine 
different events that were likely to cause the formation of flashbulb memories due to the pivotal 
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aspects that these events contained.  Also, previous research has demonstrated that as the number 
of rehearsals of a memory increases, the vivid reminiscence of these memories will also increase 
as time passes (Julian, et al., 2009).  In addition, Fels (2011) found that regardless of the affect 
level at the time of encoding, individuals who rehearsed events numerous times were better able 
to retain their memories and were also better able to reiterate facts from the time of the event.  
Likewise, an increase in the number of attempts to recall was found to aid memory when it was 
recalled at a later time, which demonstrates how rehearsal can act as a practiced instance of 
remembering (Tulving, 1969).   
Overall, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the more an individual rehearses his or 
her cancer diagnosis memory, the more easily and more vivid the memory should be with each 
additional retrieval. Similarly, the same is expected for childhood injury events and car 
accidents.  
 
Consequentiality 
 How much an event will impact an individual’s life, otherwise known as the 
consequentiality of the event, has a strong influence on how flashbulb memories are formed and 
maintained over a long period of time.  There have been examples of this in previous research, 
such as that done by Brown and Kulik (1977), where the assassination of Martin Luther King 
was found to be more consequential for African Americans living in the United States than 
Caucasian Americans.  Also, Conway (1995) found that British citizens remembered the 
resignation of the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher better than citizens of other 
European countries.  In response to these findings, Conway (1995) developed a theory that 
events that were deemed as more consequential would be better remembered.  Talmi (2013) 
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demonstrated that stimulus priority may encourage deployment of cognitive factors, which could 
also drive priority assignment.  This explanation was derived from the combination of the 
mediation and arousal-biased competitive theories.  Lower consequentiality events have shown a 
tendency towards higher rates of forgetting with recall.  In contrast, events that are considered 
highly consequential go on to be formed into flashbulb memories (Conway, 1995).   
In opposition to the theories that indicate that higher consequentiality results in better 
recall, research done by Schmolk, Buffalo, and Squire (2000) that examined the role of 
consequentiality in memories for the OJ Simpson verdict found that consequentiality had a 
minimal effect on memory encoding and recall.  In agreement with this study’s findings, Neisser 
and Harsch (1992) found the same minimal effect of consequentiality on memory regarding the 
explosion of the Challenger. Rice (2012) also found no difference between whites and non-
whites in consequentiality in regards to the 2008 President Obama election.  However, the 
majority of the research that has been done with consequentiality, and how it relates to encoding 
and recall, is supportive of the theories that assume positive correlation. 
 A threat to survival is one of the critical aspects of consequentiality that is relevant to 
memory.  These threats can come in many different forms such as a head-on vehicle collision or 
falling from a tree as a child.  In respect to a cancer diagnosis, the idea of consequentiality can be 
easily related to a threat towards an individual’s survival.  Information that is processed as 
relevant to survival is remembered far better than information that is processed in different 
contexts (Nairne, 2010; Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010). Within the medial temporal lobe 
of the brain are “concept cells,” which are responsive to personally relevant items, or those that 
are salient enough to be memorized (Quiroga, 2012). Therefore, there may in fact be both a 
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specific part of the brain and specific type of cell that has played a role in the survival of the 
human species. 
A major consequence that is highly relevant to the current study is that of death.  Studies 
done by Mineka and O’hman (2002) and Flykt (2005) showed that the shift in focus from 
thoughtful decision making to one of highly focused attention with rapid processing has clear 
adaptive value, which enables the individual to devote attentional resources to life threatening 
stimuli in times of danger.  The thought of death can be perceived as a threatening stimuli 
because it is not compatible with evolutionary processes.  As age increases, health tends to 
decline and those surrounding an individual will begin to become deceased.  An example of the 
repercussions of these types of events was demonstrated by Carstensen & Turk Charles (1994) 
who found that older adults have a large bias towards processing material that is considered 
personally emotional.  Another study done a few years later concluded that this bias is because as 
age increases, the adult realizes that the end of life is near (Carstensen & Turk Charles, 1998).  
Adults who are at this elder stage of life realize the importance of the emotional quality of 
interactions with others, and they begin to take precedence over all other functions (Carstensen 
& Turk Charles, 1998). 
Behind the behavioral and emotional changes that accompany coping with evolutionary 
threats are chemical mechanisms occurring within the brain.  Woodson (2003) found that 
corticosterone levels were significantly elevated in cat-exposed rats in comparison with the 
group that was place in the neutral environment.  As discussed later on in this paper, high levels 
of corticosterone shut down the hippocampus, which is responsible for working memory, and 
shift the memory formation process to the amygdala, which is responsible for long-term 
memory. 
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In regards to childhood injury, it was found that these events were both more uniformly 
arousing and had superior recall of the event when compared to other traumatic childhood events 
such as parental divorce or a learning disorder diagnosis (Hillard, Gillott, & Bohannon, 2008).  
The survival mechanism that was mentioned above by Flyt (2005) has also been found to occur 
within children as well (Bjorklund & Pelligrini, 2000; Volk & Atkinson, 2008).  Long-term 
memory is a critical component to the survival mechanisms that play a role is our overall fitness.   
Due to a life threatening situation having the highest possible consequentiality, it makes sense 
that memories formed in these situations contain high levels of detail and remain easy to recall. 
 
Affect 
 Another contributing characteristic of flashbulb memories that has been found to better 
encoding and enhance maintenance of the memory over time is the extent of the affect that the 
particular event has.  Affect can be described as the level of arousal or emotion experienced by 
the individual at the time of the event.  Different types of arousal can include shock, anger, 
distress, and etc.  James (1890) wrote that “An experience may be so exciting emotionally as 
almost to leave a scar on the cerebral tissues” (670).  Previous research on flashbulb memories 
has found that the higher the affect at the time of the event, the better the recall of the long-
lasting memory of the arousing event (Colgrove, 1899; Winograd & Killenger, 1983; Bohannon, 
1998; Julian et al., 2009).  The Mediation Theory proposed by Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & 
Moscovitch (2007) suggests that emotional events recruit other cognitive resources such as 
attention, distinctive processing, and organization in comparison to neutral events, which results 
in a memory advantage.  According to Tekcan and Peynircioglu (2003), and Bernsten and 
Thomsen (2005), the accuracy and durability of emotional memories can span decades.  In other 
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words, the more emotionally aroused the individual is at the time of encoding, the more easily 
the memory will be recalled.   
Unlike emotionally arousing events, emotionally neutral events have been found to 
demonstrate lower levels of the amount of recall.  Events that have been deemed as emotionally 
neutral do not show the same level of detail that those of emotional memories do.  Extensive 
research has shown that strong emotionality can enhance memory (Cahill, Gorski, & Le, 2003; 
McGaugh, 2004; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004; Nielson, Yee, & Erickson, 2005).  Kensinger 
et al. (2002) showed that adults of two different age ranges showed better recall for highly 
arousing pictures than for the low arousing pictures.  These same results also demonstrated a 
similar trend when concerning valence of the memories, showing a greater amount of recall for 
the negative and positive stimuli when compared to the neutral stimuli. Talmi and McGarry 
(2012) found that the participants in their study allotted more attention to emotional pictures 
which in turn accounted for greater emotional memory.  Graves et al. (2007) compared both 
younger and older adults’ responses to neutral and arousing stimuli, and the results showed that 
the mean ratings from their analysis were significantly higher for the arousing story than for the 
neutral story for both emotionality and personal reactions; these findings allowed them to 
conclude that emotional arousal enhanced memory for central detail.   
In comparison to the previous findings regarding age gap and consequentiality, Graves et 
al. (2007) demonstrated that the younger and older adult age groups did not differ in regards to 
emotionality, but did in fact significantly differ for personal reactions with the older adults 
having a higher mean rating.  However, older adults showed an overall stronger personal reaction 
than younger adults for both neutral and arousing stories (Graves et al, 2007).  With most 
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samples having a large age range, it is important to acknowledge the age differences in 
participants and that age’s effect on how incoming information is perceived.  
In relation to positive versus negative arousal, events that were deemed as positive 
showed more detail than those that were deemed negative (Lindsay, Wade, Hunter, & Read, 
2004). Dissociation models propose that impaired retrieval of personal memories is a defensive 
response that reduces awareness of aversive memories (van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1989).  
However, other models suggest that individuals may adopt an avoidant coping style in response 
to a traumatic event that results in impaired access or reporting of trauma memories (Fivush, 
Sales, Goldberg, Bahrick, & Parker, 2004).   
There is current debate about the fine line between the level of hormone that produces 
highly detailed encoding versus levels that can cause obstructed encoding and repressed recall.  
Talmi (2013) summarizes from previous work that the arousal caused by an emotional event 
induces the release of the stress hormones adrenaline and cortisol, which trigger the activation of 
the amygdala which is important for memory consolidation of information during emotional 
events.  Duffy (1957) indicates that “the optimal degree of activation appears to be a moderate 
one which expresses the relationship between activation and quality of performance taking the 
form of an inverted U” (268).   Andreano & Cahill (2006) also found an inverted-U-shaped 
relationship between cortisol levels and memory consolidation in human subjects. It was 
concluded from further analysis that an intermediate level of cortisol correlated with peak 
memory performance (Andreano & Cahill, 2006).  In summary, it has been found across multiple 
studies that an intermediate level of arousal creates the optimal level of hormones for memory 
consolidation that will result in superb recall. 
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With memory being capable of being broken down into sub-types such as working and 
long-term episodic, stress has the capability of inducing different effects depending on the 
memory type being utilized.  Working memory has been found to be more susceptible to 
impairment by stress than long term memory in a novel environment (Woodson et al., 2003). 
Any stress induced memory impairment found by Woodson et al. (2003) was selective for 
recently acquired spatial working memory.  These findings were supportive of findings from 
Diamond et al. (1996) found that stress produced retrograde amnesia by interfering with recently 
acquired, but not long-term spatial memory.  On the other hand, it has been found that long-term 
episodic recognition memory was significantly enhanced for pleasant, aversive, and interesting 
pictures that were relevant to neutral pictures (Hamann, Ely, & Clinton, 1999).  In a study done 
by Kangas, Henry, and Bryant (2005), participants who were suffering from acute stress disorder 
generated significantly fewer specific memories than participants without the disorder.  Along 
with their findings, Harvey et al. (1998) found that deficits in autobiographical memory recall in 
acute stress disorder are not simply a function of depression.  
Deficits in autobiographical memory could be related to many other factors, with one 
possibility being age.  A study done by Turk et al. (2003) revealed that both recall and 
recognition tests show a tendency for younger adults to have better recall for negatively valenced 
stimuli than older adults.  Turk et al. (2003) explained these results by way of the socioemotional 
selectivity theory, which states that older adults are better able to regulate their emotions in a 
way, that they are able to maintain positive affect and decrease negative affect.  It is important to 
note that Turk et al. (2003) strongly believed that these memory differences were not secondary 
to age related cognitive declines, but were in fact due to enhancement of emotional regulation 
over time. 
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There have been several mechanisms proposed for the explanation of deficits in 
autobiographical memories following traumatic events.  One of these mechanisms proposes that 
the dissociative symptoms in acute stress disorder will result in the impaired retrieval of trauma-
related memories because these memories are associated with a strong negative affect (van der 
Kolk & van der Hart, 1989).  Foa & Hearst-Ikeda (1996) recommended a mechanism involving 
cognitive avoidance which results in the inability to recall traumatic memories.  In relation to this 
study, patients with acute stress disorder may be unwilling to access and/or report a specific 
traumatic memory, which is consistent with recent developmental studies of impaired retrieval in 
stressed children (Fivush et al., 2004).   
The last of these mechanisms allocate that autobiographical memory deficit following 
trauma may occur because the intrusive symptoms deplete cognitive capacity that would 
otherwise be devoted to meaningful memory search (McNally et al., 1994; Wilhelm et al., 1997; 
Williams, 1996).  Joseph (1998; 1999) found that under conditions of overwhelming terror, what 
was experienced may be forgotten or stored abnormally.  It is important to note that in a study 
done by Stratton (1919) female rats as well has human females appeared to respond differently to 
acute stress than did males of each species.  It is a possibility that cancer patients may lack the 
additional essential resources to allot to memory retrieval depending on how negatively arousing 
they perceived their diagnostic consultation (Kangas, Henry, and Bryant, 2005). 
 The fact that children’s memory skills improve over the age span from four to 17 makes 
it hard to determine whether the increase in elaboration of autobiographical memories is due to 
the increase in affect, or is due to an increase in general memory skills (Agypt, 2007).  In 
similarity to divorce memories of children, childhood injury is also high in affect.  In support of 
that these memories are due to affect and not an improvement in general memory skills as age 
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increases during adolescence, Thornberry and Bohannon (2009) found that childhood injury 
memories showed little developmental change from the range of six years old into teens.  Both 
relational processing (integrated structure) and item-specific processing (discriminability) have 
shown effects that enhance the storage and retrieval of information in both adults and children 
(Burns, 2006; Howe, 2006).  Since survival tasks elicit self-referential processing, these findings 
make sense.  This evidence shows that these mechanisms that form the evolutionary adaptions in 
human memory are present early in life, and are deemed developmentally invariant according to 
Howe & Otgaar (2013). 
 
Neuroscience Behind Encoding and Recall 
Due to the physiological changes that occur within the brain over time, it is important to 
understand how these physical changes effect memory mechanisms.  The medial temporal lobe 
consists of an interconnected hierarchy of areas in the brain which include the amygdala, 
hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex (Quiroga et al., 
2008).  The hippocampus is at the top of this hierarchal structure, with the amygdala having 
connections to the other MTL areas and sensory cortex (Quiroga, 2012).  Neurons that are 
present in the human MTL have been found in previous research to be selectively activated 
according to the level of novelty and familiarity with an image, with the amygdala being 
concerned with relevant emotional processing in regards to fear (Quiroga et al., 2008).   
According to Suthana & Fried (2012), the ability to form new episodic memories is 
dependent on an intact hippocampus and surrounding MTL.  However, for the MTL to encode 
properly, the event must be perceived and processed in the upstream cortices (Suthana & Fried, 
2012).  In disagreement with the consolidation model, the recall of episodic memories is always 
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dependent on the hippocampus (Quiroga, 2012).  According to the multiple trace theory, the 
hippocampus is always necessary for binding different neocortical representations of an event to 
recall the episodic memory at a later time (Quiroga, 2012). 
Responses that take place in the MTL, hippocampus, and entorhinal cortex are extremely 
particular because these responses are crucial in the transformation of novel stimuli to depictions 
that can be consciously retrieved later on as episodic memories (Suthana & Fried, 2012).  In fact, 
several functional neuroimaging studies in humans have shown that the same brain areas activate 
during the encoding of new distinct information and the recall of this encoded information 
(Suthana & Fried, 2012).  Previous research has found that patients with MTL damage lose the 
ability to form new episodic memories (Suthana & Fried, 2012).  In agreement with this, Quiroga 
(2012) found previous evidence that demonstrated MTL lesions cause anterograde amnesia. 
Work done by Cahill et al. (1995) and Adolphs et al. (1997) suggested that the results of 
damage to the amygdala in human patients indicate that the amygdala plays a role in enhancing 
episodic memory.  Hamann, Ely, & Clinton (1999) found that for aversive pictures, recognition-
memory enhancement was directly correlated with bilateral amygdala activity during the 
aversive picture scans.  However, there was a slight preference for an inferior and right-
lateralized activation for positive pictures (Hamann, Ely, & Clinton, 1999).  A follow up 
correlation analysis of these imaging findings demonstrated a specific relationship between the 
enhancement of episodic memory for both pleasant and unpleasant emotional stimuli and the 
level of activity in the amygdala.  Subjects who showed greater episodic-memory enhancement 
that was associated with emotional stimuli also tended to have higher levels of activity in the 
amygdala when compared to the subjects who showed the least enhancement (Hamann, Ely, 
Clinton, 1999).  The amygdala activity that Kensinger, Kensinger, & Addis (2011) found 
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supports encoding of item-specific details and leads to the retention of a vivid memories with 
episodic details.  Dolcos, Denkova, & Dolcos (2012) reported a correlation between activation in 
the amygdala and medial temporal lobes with successful encoding of emotional stimuli in 
contrast to neutral stimuli.  
Hamann, Ely, & Clinton (1999) also demonstrated that recognition-memory enhancement 
for both pleasant and aversive pictures were correlated with bilateral activity in the hippocampal 
region.  Diamond et al. (2007) found that the initiation of a stressful experience produces an 
intense, brief, initiation of memory-encoding malleability within the hippocampus.   This process 
involves a shift in the hippocampus from its cognitive mapping mode to flashbulb memory mode 
(Diamond et al., 2007).  However, Kolk (1996) found that extreme arousal demonstrates an 
inhibitory effect on the hippocampus’ memory functions.  In rebuttal to this, multiple studies 
have found that acute stress can interfere with cognitive and electrophysiological measures of 
hippocampal functioning (Lupien & McEwen, 1997; de Kloet, Oitzl, & Joels, 1999; Kim & 
Diamond, 2002). 
Joseph (1998; 1999) found that that hippocampus cannot coordinate its functioning when 
an individual is experiencing overpowering fear; under these conditions, whatever the individual 
experiences may be distorted when it is encoded or completely forgotten.  Due to this failure of 
the hippocampus under these conditions, the amygdala steps in to encode these emotional 
memories and assist with their recall.  Another study performed by Metcalfe and Jacobs (1998) 
supplies further evidence for these previous findings and calls the amygdala a component of the 
“hot” memory system because it functions optimally under emotionally intense conditions.  It 
has also been found by numerous studies that fear conditioning produces long-lasting increases 
in excitability in the amygdala (Adamec, Blundell, & Collins, 2001; Schroeder & Shinnick-
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Gallagher, 2005; Adamec et al., 1998; Rosen, Adamec, & Thompson, 2005).  Woodson et al. 
(2003) found that hippocampal-dependent working memory was more susceptible to 
impairments by stress than hippocampal-independent long-term memory, which further supports 
previous research done by Diamond et al. (1996) which showed that the memory impairments 
secondary to increased corticosterone levels was selective for hippocampal-dependent memory 
over hippocampal-independent memory. 
In relation to previously discussed cortisol levels in relation to affect, Mico, McEwen, & 
Shein (1979) demonstrated that subsequent glucocorticoid-related behavioral work has led to the 
conclusion that long periods of stress can suppress optimal hippocampal functioning.  However, 
amygdala activation is necessary for the modulation of memory by glucocorticoids, as well as for 
the induced suppression of hippocampal LTP (Roozendaal & McGaugh, 1997; Kim et al., 2001; 
Roozendaal et al., 2001; Akirav & Richter-Levin, 1999; Richter-Levin & Akirav, 2000). Cahill 
et al. (1996) found a significant positive correlation between the level of brain glucose metabolic 
rate in the right amygdala during encoding and the number of emotional, but not neutral, films 
recalled three weeks later. These results demonstrate a relationship between amygdala activity 
and episodic memory for aversive stimuli (Cahill et al., 1996). Under conditions of acute stress 
or the administration of corticosterone, it was found that hippocampal LTP was blocked (Shors 
et al., 1990; Shors & Thompson, 1992; Pavlides et al., 1995; Pavlides et al., 1995; Pavlides et al., 
1996; Garcia et al., 1997; Pavlides & McEwen, 1999; Akirav & Richter-Levin, 1999; Zhou, 
Zhang, & Zhang, 2000; Wang, Akirav, & Richter-Levin, 2000; Kim et al., 2001; Alfarez et al., 
2002; Xiong, Wei, & Xiang, 2004; Kim et al., 2005; Krugers et al., 2005; Weiegert et al., 2005; 
de Quervain, Roozendaal, & McGaugh, 1998; Conrad, Lupien, & McEwen, 1999; Roosendaal et 
al., 2004; Kirschbaum et al., 1996; de Quervain et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2001; Payne et al., 2002; 
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Buss et al., 2004; Wolf et al., 2004; Kuhlmann, Kirschbaum, & Wolf, 2005; Kuhlmann, Piel, & 
Wolf, 2005; Payne et al., 2006; Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2006; Elzinga, Bakker, & 
Bremner, 2005; Jay et al., 2004; Garcia, 2001).  However, Diamond et al. (1996) found evidence 
that corticosterone levels alone are insufficient to block LTP and impair memory.  LeDoux 
(1996) found that there is an adrenal steroid threshold in the hippocampus; when this threshold is 
surpassed due to extreme and sustained levels of stress, the hippocampus can no longer optimally 
function. When this shut down of the hippocampus occurs, it has been proposed that amygdala 
functioning is enhanced (LeDoux, 1996).  
Diamond et al. (2007) also investigated the extent that the prefrontal cortex is involved 
with task performance, and was able to conclude that the extent to which the pre frontal cortex is 
involved in a task, and the degree to which the pre frontal cortex is suppressed by emotionality, 
are the primary determinants of whether a task’s arousal performance curve will be linear or 
curvilinear.  Therefore, if a task involves focused attention to an isolated cue with minimal 
cognitive demands, then the performance on that task may be enhanced under conditions of high 
arousal (Diamond et al., 2007). 
Since age varies among all participants within the cancer diagnosis group, it is important 
to examine how age might affect recall.  Cohen et. al (1994) examined older adults’ abilities to 
form flashbulb memories for emotionally arousing events; the results from this study 
demonstrated that older adults were able to form less flashbulb memories than younger adults 
were.  Cohen et al. (1994) speculated that the difference in abilities to form flashbulb memories 
could be secondary to the lowered responsiveness of the endocrine system in older adults. 
Turk et al. (2003) was mentioned earlier regarding the memory differences in older and 
younger adults in relation to the emotionality of the stimuli.  This study turned to the 
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socioemotional selectivity theory as mentioned above, for the explanation of these results, which 
were also supported by the research done by Mather et al. (2004).  Mather measured the 
activation of the amygdala in both younger and older adults in response to positively arousing, 
negatively arousing, and neutral visual stimulation.  This study revealed that older adults had a 
higher level of activation change when the visual stimuli altered from neutral to positive, 
whereas younger adults showed an equal level of activation change when visual stimuli altered 
from neutral to negative and from neutral to positive (Mather et al., 2004).  These results support 
the same idea that Turk et al. (2003) put forth, in that older adults are less responsive to negative 
emotional stimuli than younger adults.  Overall, receiving a cancer diagnosis is an acutely 
stressful event which has the capability to enhance or inhibit encoding of the information.  The 
current study will provide insight to which side of this pole is true for cancer patients. 
 
Cancer Treatment Consequences  
 Chemotherapy has been found to impair both cognitive function and memory, with 
ranges from 75-95%; however, over a period of two years, these statistics drop to 17-35% 
impairment after the patient’s last chemotherapy treatment (Ahles & Saykin, 2001).  Previous 
research has also shown that the fatigue and depression experienced by cancer patients are both 
associated with decreased cognitive function (Bender et al., 2006; Castellon et al., 2004).  
Therefore, after a patient has successfully completed a round of chemotherapy and feels a sense 
of triumph, it should be predicted that their cognitive abilities should start to increase, not only 
because their severity of depression would decrease, but also because of the adverse physical 
effects of the chemotherapy itself such as fatigue. 
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 However, recent research has revealed that active treatment may not negatively impact 
memory functions.  In a study performed by Myers, Sousa, and Donovan (2010), no significant 
correlations were seen between active disease and memory problems, inferring that active 
chemotherapy treatment does not have as devastating of an effect on memory.  Myers et al. 
(2010) was also able to identify fatigue as a significant predictor of memory problems, which 
agrees with the previous research done by Bender et al. (2006) and Castellon et al. (2004).  It 
was also reported by Myers et al. (2010) that no significant difference in the severity of memory 
problems was seen between participants who had received chemotherapy as part of their 
treatment at some period, and those participants who were actively receiving chemotherapy.  A 
slightly negative correlation between time since chemotherapy and the report of memory 
problems was also found in Myers et al. (2010), which further supports the earlier findings of  
Ahles and Saykin (2001). 
 Another form of treatment which is most common for solid tumors is radiation.  
Cognitive deficits associated with cancer radiation therapy of brain tumors include prominent 
dysfunction of episodic memory (Roman & Sperduto, 1995; Anderson et al., 2000; Moore et al., 
1992; Crossen et al., 1994; Abayomi, 1996; Lee et al., 1989; Surma-aho et al., 2001; Kramer et 
al., 1997; Wefel et al., 2010; Dietrich et al., 2008).  It should also be noted that a study done by 
Armstrong et al. (1993), showed that patients who underwent radiation therapy treatment for 
brain tumors showed an initial deterioration in long-term memory, regardless of the location of 
the tumor, on an average of about 1.5 months status post the completion  of the treatment.  
However, patients also consistently demonstrated the rebound phenomenon between 4.7 and 7.6 
months after the treatment (Armstrong et al., 1993). 
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The concept of rebound is important in regards to the improved functioning of memory 
for specific tasks.  Hippocampal neurogenesis (growth of the nerve cells within the 
hippocampus) appears critical for at least some hippocampal-dependent memory tasks (Monje & 
Dietrich, 2012).  In a study done with rodents, increased hippocampal neurogenesis results in 
improved performance in certain hippocampal-dependent memory tasks (van Praag et al., 1999).  
According to Monje and Dietrich (2012), impairment of hippocampal neurogenesis may explain 
the profound difficulties patients experience encoding new episodic memories following 
treatment for cancers requiring radiation.  Chemotherapeutic agents have also been found to 
impair hippocampal neurogenesis in experimental models (Seigers et al., 2008; Winocur et al., 
2006; Mignone & Weber, 2006).  Depending on the delay between diagnosis and the completion 
of the protocol, the current study will be better able to clarify the inhibition and rebound aspects 
of memory after treatment. 
 
The Current Study 
 The current quasi-experiment examined how the acute or chronic consequentiality of a 
childhood injury memory and car accident memory versus cancer diagnosis memory affected the 
recall of the memory overall.  These events were of natural cause, and therefore provided the 
experimenter with a view to the inside mechanisms that are likely to enhance memory.  We 
examined how the affect and consequentiality of a patient at the time of their cancer diagnosis 
affected the vividness of the individual’s memory.  Childhood injury is an event that has a high 
emotional response during encoding but without long-term threat, and therefore this should 
create the parallel for comparison (Hillman et al., 2010).  Car accidents are also experiences that 
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involve high levels of arousal, and have the potential to involve possible chronic pain or 
disability after the fact. 
 Similar to two previous studies that looked at childhood injury memories and car accident 
memories (Hillman et al., 2010; Shaneyfelt, Minor, & Bohannon, 2008), three experimental 
predictions were made. First, if an evolutionary memory pathway exists to determine threat over 
and above arousal, then a cancer diagnosis should be more threatening, and also be a better 
remembered event, regardless of the effects of rehearsal and arousal at the time of encoding.  
Second, if the arousal mechanism is the proximal cause of flashbulb characteristics in cancer 
diagnoses memories, then the three different kinds of consequentiality being studied should be 
equally remembered once the arousal levels of each event are equated.  These types of 
consequentiality include: acute non-lethal threats, cute potentially lethal threats, and the chronic-
lethal threats (Appendix 3), should be equally remembered once the arousal levels of each event 
are equated.   Another way of looking at the issue is once delay, rehearsal, and arousal at the 
discovery/event are equated, do the memories across events differ in quantity or resistance to 
decay?   Lastly, if the evolutionary age of the mechanisms alone determines memory, then the 
actual injuries with imagery and real immediate pain should be best recalled regardless of delay, 
rehearsal or rated arousal.  Both painful and visual inputs are considered evolutionarily old and 
should carry weight over and above the evolutionary late achievement of language.  Hence, there 
should be memorial consequences of language, with the self in the case of cancer diagnoses, and 
with the other in the case of childhood injury where the parent heard about the injury.  Also, a 
hierarchy should be seen between the self and other, where the self is more important even if the 
other is of biological issue such as in the case of the parent in childhood injury. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The current study assessed 44 individuals who had a confirmed cancer diagnosis.  
Participants could have a current or previous cancer diagnosis, and were not excluded based on 
any kind of treatment or medication that they may have received.  Participants had to be 18 years 
or older to participate.  The patients ranged from 22-75 years of age (M = 52.43 years, SD = 
13.76) with 37 of participants being female and seven being male.  The average age of diagnosis 
was 47 years old (SD = 12.80).  Due to the confidential subject matter of medical information, 
participants involved in this study emailed and/or called the researcher if they wished to 
participate.  The participants were recruited through different mediums: flyers that were sent out 
on a national level to cancer support groups, personal recruiting in psychology classes, and use 
of the Butler University SONA system. 
 The participants signed a statement of informed consent before beginning the study that 
was included in the US mail packet, or the electronic version for the e-mail version of the 
protocol (See Appendix 2).  Participants were informed that they could discontinue the study at 
any time without any repercussions.  All protocols were kept completely confidential, and 
participant lists were safely stored in a location only accessible to the researcher.  Participants 
were given a $5 Starbucks gift card based on their completed protocol return, and were also 
entered in a drawing to win a $50 Visa gift card as additional compensation for participating in 
the research project. 
 Hillman et al. (2010) assessed 110 freshmen undergraduates at Butler University who 
suffered an injury as a child that required a trip to the hospital.  Out of these participants, 77 of 
were female and 20 were male.  The remaining 13 participants did not indicate their gender.  The 
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average age of injury was 10.92 years old (SD = 4.49), with all of the participants being 18 years 
old at the time of recall.  Participants were offered extra credit in one of their psychology classes 
for participation.  In addition to the participants filling out a survey, they were also asked to 
provide their parents information so that they could be sent a protocol inquiring about their view 
of the injury. 
 Out of the 109 participants who took the childhood injury survey and provided parental 
information, 101 parents sent in a completed protocol.  The age and the gender of the parent 
were not asked.  Of the 101 parents who responded, 37 of them had actually seen their child’s 
injury, while the remaining 63 were not present and heard about their child’s injury through word 
of mouth. 
Shaneyfelt, Minor, & Bohannon (2008) assessed 75 undergraduate students at Butler 
University who had experienced a car accident.  For inclusion of this data in the current study, 
the participant had to not have seen the accident coming. Of this sample, 21 of the participants 
were male and the remaining 54 participants were female.  The average current age of these 
participants was 19.62 years old (SD = 1.05), with the average delay between the accident and 
the time of recall being 4.51 years (SD = 6.04).  For their participation, students were given extra 
credit in one of their psychology classes. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 The current study took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete.  The study consisted of 
a single protocol which tested the participant’s memories for discovering their cancer diagnosis 
(Appendix 2).  The diagnosis protocol was compromised of two main parts.  The first part 
consisted of a free recall narrative which asked the participants to describe the memory for the 
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discovery of the diagnosis.  The second part of the protocol consisted of discovery probed 
questions about the participant’s discovery memory, such as the age of the participant at the time 
of the diagnosis, number of times the participant’s discovery was told to others, as well as the 
expectedness of the diagnosis, vividness of the diagnosis, and arousal level of the announcement 
of the diagnosis.  The probed questions resembled the following: “What were you wearing at the 
time you learned of your diagnosis?”; “What did you do right after discovering your diagnosis?” 
and “Where were you when you learned of your diagnosis?”  After each discovery probe 
question the participant’s confidence level was assessed using a scale ranging from 1-5, where 1 
indicated no confidence and 5 indicated extreme confidence.  In addition to the discovery probed 
questions, other questions concerning the diagnosis were also asked.  Such questions included 
“After your diagnosis, did you receive extra support?” and “After the diagnosis took place, how 
did you feel?” 
 After the completed protocol was received either by e-mail or US mail, the participant 
was mailed a $5 Starbucks gift card and entered into a drawing to win a $50 Visa gift card for 
participation.  The address of the participant was provided by the participant after they indicated 
in the beginning of the study that they were interested in the $5 Starbucks gift card. 
 The seven canonical features used in scoring the narratives as well as the ten probe 
questions used in the probe response section were scored and assessed across all three event 
conditions. The canonical features for the free recall section was ranked on a scale of 0-3, with 3 
indicating more elaboration (Appendix 4).  The canonical features for the probed response 
section were ranked on a scale of 0-2, with 2 indicating more elaboration (Appendix 6).  
Participants were also asked to rate their confidence in their probed responses on a 1-5 scale, 
with 5 indicating the most confidence that their answer is accurate. 
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 Each free recall portion of the protocol was scored in accordance with Brown and Kulik’s 
(1977) characteristics for emotional and personal memories.  Seven different canonical features 
were used when scoring the free recall portion of the protocols: others present (those present 
during the event), author’s affect (the emotional reaction of the individual) activity (any behavior 
that occurred prior to the event), location (where the participant was during the event), time 
(when the event occurred), other’s affect (the emotion reaction of individuals other than the 
participant that were present for the event), and aftermath (any behavior that occurred after the 
event).  The scoring system was a 0-3 scale, where 0 elicits no response and 3 elicits an elaborate 
response (Appendix 4). 
 The probed questions further investigated the canonical features that were of interested, 
as well as other details surrounding the diagnosis event and the aftermath. Questions such as 
these assessed the weather that day, any indication of previous knowledge about their diagnosis, 
support received from family and friends, and any medications they received besides 
chemotherapy agents.  The scoring system was on a 0-2 scale, where 0 elicits no response and 2 
elicits an elaborate response (Appendix 6). 
 Only one other researcher and I scored all of the protocols to avoid inter-rater reliability 
inconsistencies, which resulted in a reliability estimate of 91% for the scoring rules of the free 
responses and 96% for the scoring rules of the probed responses.  Scores were entered into 
Microsoft-Excel and later uploaded to a statistical analysis program called Stat-View 5 for 
further analysis.  Data from the current study on discovering a person’s diagnosis was then 
compared to previously collected data from childhood injury memories for both the child and 
parents and car accident memories (See Appendix 3).  
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In the study performed by Hillman et al. (2010), participants completed the similarly 
formatted two part protocol that the cancer patients had, with the exception of the question 
content which was focused on their injury versus a cancer diagnosis.  This protocol consisted of 
the free recall narrative and probed recall responses, which also included a confidence in answers 
component.  Hillman et al. (2010) used the same scoring mechanisms based on canonical 
features as mentioned above.  This allowed us to use this data for comparison analysis. 
Shaneyfelt, Minor, & Bohannon (2008) also used the same protocol format as the current 
study and Hillman et al. (2010), with the content focused on the car accident memory.  This 
similar protocol format allowed the researcher of the current study to make comparisons across 
all 5 sets of data due to this data being scored on the same scales.  As a set standard within the 
research lab where all of these studies have been performed, it can be assumed that both the car 
accident and childhood injury scoring rules resulted in inter rater reliability results that were at 
least or over 90%. 
 
RESULTS 
Multiple ANOVAs were run with differing independent and dependent variables.  After 
initial ANOVAs were ran looking at how the different flashbulb characteristics differed by event 
type, further ANOVAs were performed to pursue different aspects of significant results.  If the 
F-value was significant, Fischer’s LSD post-hoc analysis was run to differentiate which groups 
significantly differed from each other.  ANOVA results for comparison of flashbulb 
characteristics between events, as well as means and Cohen’s    can be found below in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Means and measures of the five events  
 Cancer 
Diagnosis 
(N = 44) 
Car 
Accident*** 
(N = 74) 
Childhood 
Injury**** 
(N = 109) 
Parent 
View 
(N = 37) 
Parent 
Hear 
(N = 63) 
  
 M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
F (4, 326) 
Cohen’s 
   
Test Delay 
5.21 
(5.57) 
4.51 
(6.04) 
6.41 
(4.28) 
6.80 
(4.54) 
6.44 
(4.05) 
2.4** 0.13 
Affect 
4.09 
(1.31) 
4.03 
(.93) 
3.19 
(.99) 
3.41 
(.90) 
3.28 
(.75) 
12.9* 0.38 
Recounts 
54.95 
(43.69) 
16.11 
(21.50) 
20.22 
(20.64) 
10.82 
(10.44) 
12.12 
(14.14) 
23* 0.56 
Vividness 
2.30 
(1.67) 
4.08 
(.82) 
3.72 
(.87) 
3.65 
(.86) 
3.56 
(.96) 
23* 0.51 
Free Recall 
.59 
(.18) 
.48 
(.17) 
.52 
(.14) 
.52 
(.19) 
.41 
(.21) 
7.5* 0.28 
Probed 
.78 
(.17) 
.77 
(.22) 
.68 
(.13) 
.66 
(.15) 
.58 
(.18) 
13.2* 0.39 
Confidence 
.83 
(.14) 
.70 
(.16) 
.86 
(.12) 
.84 
(.18) 
.83 
(.17) 
15.2* 0.42 
*p < .0001 
**p < .0518 
***Car accident data was collected from Shaneyfelt, Minor, & Bohannon, 2008 
****Childhood injury memory was collected from Hillman et al., 2010 
 
 
Delay 
 When the events were compared to one another, delay was marginally significant, F (4, 
315) = 2.38, p < .0518.  Car accidents had the shortest delay, and significantly differed from all 
of the other memories besides cancer diagnoses.  None of the other events significantly differed 
from each other. 
 
Affect 
 The emotional status of the participant at the time of encoding significantly differed 
between the six different events, F (4, 321) = 12.90, p < .0001.  Cancer diagnosis memories had 
the highest affect ratings, which were significantly higher when compared to all of the other 
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events besides car accidents.  The same was true for car accident memories in that they were 
significantly different from all of the other events besides cancer diagnoses. None of the events 
relating to childhood injury significantly differed from each other. 
 
Recounts 
 Recounts, or the number of times that the participant retold the story to another, 
statistically significantly differed between events, F (4, 306) = 25.03, p < .0001.   Car accidents 
and cancer diagnoses did not differ from each other as events that threatened the rememberer, 
and both had high affect ratings.  All the affect ratings related to the three childhood injury-
related events were low, and did not differ from each other. 
 Another analysis was performed where information type replaced event type as the 
independent variable.  How the participant received the information (via pain, vision, or 
language) had a significant effect on the number of times that the event was retold to others, F (2, 
308) = 8.12, p < .0004 (See Figure 5).  Those who received information through language, which 
include parents who were told about their child’s injury and cancer diagnosis patients, had the 
highest number of recounts (M = 28.80, SD = 35.96).  In addition, language input participants (M 
= 28.80, SD = 35.96) had significantly higher numbers of recounts than both pain input 
participants (M = 18.58, p < .0019) and vision input participants (M = 10.82, p < .0003).  
However, pain and vision input participants did not significantly differ from each other.  Again 
this lack of significant difference may be due to the fact that both pain and vision are more 
evolutionarily old than language, and they produce strong enough memories where the individual 
does not need to recount them as often to retain their quality.   
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Figure 5 here 
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Vividness 
 The vividness of the memories significantly differed between event types, F (4, 318) = 
21.97, p < .0001.  Car accident memories had the highest vividness ratings, whereas cancer 
diagnosis memories had the lowest vividness ratings.  Further analysis of these means revealed 
that car accident vividness ratings were significantly higher than all of the other events used for 
comparison.  In addition, cancer diagnosis memories had significantly lower vividness ratings 
than childhood injury memories, parents who viewed their child being injured, and parents who 
heard about their child’s injury.  From these results, it seems that the method of information 
input could play a role in vividness, in addition to whom the threat is directed at. 
 Another ANOVA was performed to see if there was an interaction effect between victim 
roles and affect group on the vividness of memory.  Victim status had no significant main effect 
on vividness of memory, but if it was combined with affect group in an interaction, a significant 
impact on memory vividness occurred, F (2, 31) = 3.08, p < .0475 (See Figure 3).  Affect group 
alone had a marginal main effect on vividness ratings, F (2, 315) = 2.56, p < .0787.  The means 
for the affect group vividness ratings demonstrated an inverted “U” shape (See Figure. 4).  
Parents who had an injured child and were categorized into the upset affect group had the highest 
vividness rating (M = 4.33, SD = .52), whereas parents who fell into the calm category had the 
lowest vividness ratings (M = 3.36, SD = 1.00).  These results demonstrate that when the threat is 
directed towards another, specifically another who is of genetic similarity to oneself, affect plays 
an important role.  In addition, these outcomes lead to the assumption that vividness and 
confidence have a different set of mechanisms than memory quantity does. 
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 Another ANOVA was run where event type was replaced by information input type as 
the independent variable.  Vividness ratings significantly differed between information type 
groups, F (2, 320) = 19.34, p < .0001 (See Figure 6).  Those who experienced pain (car accident 
and childhood injury participants) had higher vividness ratings of their memories (M = 3.86, SD 
= .87) than those who heard about the event (parents who weren’t present when their child was 
injured and cancer patients diagnosis conversation) (M = 3.04, p < .0001).  In addition, those 
who saw the event happen (M = 3.65, SD = .86) (car accidents and parents viewing their child 
become injured) also had higher vividness ratings that those who heard the event (M = 3.04, p < 
.0034).  However, pain and visual input participants did not significantly differ in their vividness 
ratings.   
----------------------------- 
Figure 6 here 
----------------------------- 
 
Free Recall Narrative 
 Events differed in the amount of detail contained, F (4, 315) = 7.49, p < .0001.  Cancer 
diagnosis memory narratives had the largest amount of detail, whereas narratives of parents who 
had heard about their child’s injury had the least (See Table 1).  Also, cancer diagnosis narrative 
memories were significantly more detailed than car accident memories, childhood injury 
memories, and parents who heard about their child’s injury.  In addition, cancer diagnosis 
memories were marginally more detailed than parents who viewed their child’s injury.  This 
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marginal effect could be due to the evolutionary survival threat to the parent, since their child is 
their genetic offspring.   
Car accident memories had significantly greater detail than parent’s memory of hearing 
about their child’s injury.  This particular result demonstrated the effect that victim status has, in 
whether it is directed at the self or another who is genetically related to the self.  Within the three 
childhood injury related events, childhood injury memories had significantly more detail in the 
free recall narratives than parents who heard about their child’s injury, and these memories were 
also significantly less detailed than memories of parents who viewed their child’s injury.  These 
results again demonstrate that the information input type has an effect on a memory’s quality, 
with pain being remembered the best and a verbal recount of threat to another being the worst. 
 Another ANOVA was performed, but the independent variable was changed from event 
type to the information input method.  The different information types did not significantly differ 
from each other.  Next, information input type was replaced with victim status (self versus other) 
as the independent variable.  Whether the victim was the self, or a parent’s offspring, made a 
significant difference on the amount of detail in the free recall narrative, F (1, 318) = 9.81, p < 
.0019.  When the event happened to the individual present in the experience (M = .52, SD = .17), 
the free recall contained significantly more detail than when the event happened to another (M = 
.45, p < .0019).  
An additional ANOVA was performed in order to see if there was an interaction effect 
between victim roles (self versus other) and affect group (calm, moderate, or upset) on free recall 
detail.  Victim roles did not significantly differ from each other in regards to the level of detail 
contained in the free recall responses, whereas affect groups did, F (2, 310) = 3.91, p < .0210 
(See Figure 1).  Upset participants had the highest detail in their free recall narratives (M = .55, 
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SD = .17).  Instead of the moderate affect group (M = .48, SD = .16) having the next highest 
mean for detail, the calm group was next in line for the level of detail (M = .50, SD = .19).  The 
interaction between victim role and affect group categorization was significant, F (2, 310) = 6.11, 
p < .0025.  Both the calm (M = .50, p < .0499) and moderate (M = .48, p < .0097) affect groups 
had significantly lower levels of detail in their narratives than the upset affect group (M = .55, 
SD = .17).  When the victim was another person, in this case a parent’s child, and that parent was 
upset at the time of encoding, they had the highest amount of detail in the free recall narrative (M 
= .66, SD = .32).  However, if the parent was calm at the time of encoding, they had the least 
amount of detail in their narratives (M = .42, SD = .21). 
A new ANOVA was run to analyze how the free recall narrative detail level was affected 
by event type, affect group, and recount group.  As mentioned above, free recall significantly 
differed by event type.  However in this new comparison, the results differed for the effects on 
the free recall detail, F (4, 268) = 4.24, p < .0024.  Recount groups also significantly differed in 
the amounts of detail in their narratives F (1, 268) = 5.55, p < .0192.  In this analysis, affect 
groups did not significantly differ in the amount of detail that their free recall narratives 
contained. 
The interaction between event type and affect group had a significant impact on the free 
recall narrative detail content, F (8, 268) = 2.38, p < .0173.  In addition, the event by recount 
group interaction also had a significant influence the level of detail in the narratives, F (4, 268) = 
4.36, p < .0020.  However, the affect group by recount group interaction was not significant. Yet, 
when event type was added to this interaction it marginally impacted free recall narratives, F (8, 
268) = 1.8, p < .0762. 
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Probed Question Responses 
 The probed responses of participants significantly differed between events, F (4, 324) = 
13.22, p < .0001.  Cancer diagnosis participants’ probed responses were scored the highest, 
whereas memories of parents who heard about their child’s injury scored the lowest (See Table 
1).  Cancer diagnosis memory responses were scored significantly higher than all of the other 
events besides car accidents.  Both of these memories produced high levels of detail in their 
responses, but it appears that something is lost when the threat is directed towards another and is 
conveyed through language.  Childhood injury memories had significantly higher scores on the 
probed responses than parents who heard about their child’s injury.  In addition, parents who 
were present at the time of their child’s incident had higher scored responses than parents who 
only heard about their child’s injury.  
 An ANOVA was performed in order to see if there was an interaction effect between 
victim roles and affect group categorization for probed response detail scores. The victim role 
significantly influenced the detail of the probed responses, F (1, 319) = 13.07, p < .0003.  When 
the event happened to the individual, the probed responses contained significantly more detail 
than when the event happened to another.  However, both affect group alone and the interaction 
between victim and affect group was not significant.   
A new ANOVA was run to see if there were any significant interactions that affected the 
detailed responses of the probed question of the protocol.  Again as mentioned earlier, probed 
responses of the different events significantly differed, but in this comparison the results were 
the following, F (4, 276) = 5.59, p < .0002.  In addition, recount groups significantly differed in 
how they responded, F (1, 276) = 5.47, p < .0201.  However, the interaction between event type 
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and recount group was not significant.  The affect groupings did not differ in how they 
responded to the probed questions. 
 
Probed Response Confidence 
 Probed memory confidence statistically significantly differed between events, F (4, 323) 
= 15.23, p < .0001.  Childhood injury memories had the highest confidence ratings, whereas car 
accident memories had the lowest.  In fact, car accident memories were significantly lower in 
confidence than all of the other events.  
 Another ANOVA was run to see how victim role (self or other) and affect group (calm, 
moderate, upset) influenced the confidence in the probed recall answers.  Which affect group the 
participant was split into had no effect on confidence, whereas there was a significant effect of 
victim status (self vs. other) on confidence, F (1, 319) = 13.07, p < .0003 (See Figure 2).  
However, the interaction between affect group and victim was not significant. 
----------------------- 
Figure 2 here 
----------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
Prediction One 
 Hypothesis one stated that if an evolutionary memory pathway exists to determine threat 
over and above arousal, then a cancer diagnosis should be more threatening, and also be a better 
remembered event, regardless of the effects of rehearsal and arousal at the time of encoding.  
Evolution should give an advantage to those individuals with better memories. This evolutionary 
advantage should be displayed in easily remembered experiences related to: resource gathering, 
sexual selection, and avoiding threats.  The current study only focused on the threat avoidance.   
37 
 
Howe & Otgaar (2013) came to the conclusion that evolution is a distal cause, and works 
through proximal mechanisms.  Two of these proximal mechanisms are arousal and rehearsal.  In 
relation to the current study, car accident and cancer diagnosis memories were found to not 
significantly differ for arousal, but cancer patients were likely to recount their diagnosis 
conversation twice as often.  Perhaps the increased recounts of cancer diagnosis memories are 
due to the language input of the threatening information.  Since language is newer evolutionarily, 
these memories would be expected to be the weakest; this may be why the memory must be 
rehearsed more often.  If a memory involves painful and visual input, as well as high arousal, the 
memory will not necessarily require high rehearsal to have extensive detail and other flashbulb 
characteristics (Julian, Bohannon, & Aue, 2009).  However if the memory has a low arousal 
rating, all is not lost. 
 Both car accident and cancer patients had the event directly happen to the participant. 
Threats that are directed towards the self were better remembered than threats related to others, 
even if that other is your own child and is a product of your genetics.  However, because a child 
is genetically related to each parent, one would expect parents who viewed their child’s injury to 
have better memories than parents who only heard about their child’s injury.  This is exactly 
what this study found; parents who viewed their child’s injury had both more detailed free recall 
narratives and probed questions responses. 
 Hypothesis was confirmed in that cancer diagnosis memories were remembered the best.  
However, it cannot be determined whether this superiority is due to the extremely high number 
of recounts, or because they had the highest level of threat/consequentiality.  Cancer diagnosis 
memories displayed significantly higher detail in the free recall narratives when compared to all 
of the other events.  However, in the probed recall responses, car accident memories and cancer 
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diagnosis memories were not found to significantly differ in the level of detail that they 
contained.  This demonstrates that the input mechanism may play a role that helps equate the car 
accident probed responses with the cancer diagnoses.  As discussed previously, the 
evolutionarily oldest input is pain, which is experienced by car accident participants.  In addition 
to pain, car accident participants also had the visual input at the same time.  However, 
participants who indicated that they “saw the accident coming” were removed before analysis so 
that the element of surprise was involved.  This may explain why there was no difference in the 
level of detail in the probed recall responses. 
 
Prediction Two 
The second hypothesis that if the arousal mechanism is the proximal cause of flashbulb 
characteristics in cancer diagnoses memories, then the three different kinds of consequentiality 
(cancer diagnosis, versus car accident, versus childhood injury) being studied should be equally 
remembered once the arousal levels of each event are equated.  The division of threat, 
information input, and victim status by event type is broken down in Appendix 3.  affect 
significantly differed between event types, with cancer diagnosis memories having the highest 
affect ratings and childhood injury memories having the lowest. 
The free recall narratives and probed recall responses were used to assess the detail of the 
memory.  The free recall narrative detail significantly differed between event groups, which infer 
that the different types of consequentiality play a role in how well a memory is remembered.  
However, what affect group the scores were filtered into did not significantly differ.  This 
demonstrates that arousal does not play a role in how detailed the free recall narrative of the 
memory is at the time of retrieval. 
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The number of times that a memory was recounted had a significant influence on the 
amount of detail in the free recall narrative.  This positive correlation was discussed previously 
in regards to the proximal mechanisms that contribute to memory.  However, the interaction 
between affect group and recount group was not found to be significant, which demonstrated 
how strong of pull affect has on this relationship.  Overall, affect does not seem to be a 
determining factor in how free recall narratives are rated on level of detail.   
However, affect alone does not cover the entire story of the factors that lead to better 
memory.  Both the type of event and number of recounts appear to be a crucial part of what 
determines the quality of the memory.  The problem with this relationship is that it is unable to 
be determined whether event type, number of recalls, or the relationship between these two 
variables is responsible for the increased quality. 
The probed recall responses were also used to assess memory quality in order to get a 
more comprehensive picture.  As with the free recall narratives, the amount of detail in the 
probed responses significantly differed between event types, which lets us conclude that the level 
of consequentiality and/or level of threat plays a role in the encoding of the memory.  In 
addition, the recount group classification also had a significant influence on the level of detail in 
the probed responses which mirrors the findings for the free recall narratives. 
In contrast to the free recall responses, the probed responses were influenced less by the 
level of affect at the time of encoding.  However, since both of these measures demonstrated that 
affect group does not influence the quality if memories in this study, we can be confident that 
affect is not a determining factor of a memory’s quality.  As with the free recall portion, any 
interaction effect that included affect group classification nullified the results. 
40 
 
In conclusion, the original prediction of hypothesis two was not supported.  Nonetheless, 
the event type is not the only component that influences a memory’s quality.  The number of 
recounts was also found to significantly influence both free recall narratives’ and probed 
responses’ level of detail.  Therefore, these relationships should be further analyzed in the future 
to better understand the memory mechanism at play.  In addition, it is of interest to note that the 
means for the affect group vividness ratings demonstrated an inverted “U” shape (See Figure. 4).  
This is relevant to the findings that Rubin & Kozin (1984) displayed, which is that the quantity, 
not the quality, of affect predicts memory vividness. 
 
Prediction Three 
The last hypothesis states that if the evolutionary age of the mechanisms alone 
determines memory, then the actual injuries with imagery and real immediate pain should be best 
recalled regardless of delay, rehearsal, or rated arousal.  Therefore, childhood injury and car 
accident memories should be better remembered than the parents’ memory of their child’s injury 
and cancer diagnosis memories.  
Additionally, the amount of evolutionary time that systems have to integrate information 
should also show differences in memory.  For example, pain would be the oldest form of 
environmental information that organisms have to deal with.  Fifty to one hundred millions years 
later, primitive forms of vision would inform organisms about their environment, and if those 
visual signals were related to survival or sex, they should have privilege in the memorial system.  
Vision allows nearly no delay between detecting elements in the environment and our ability to 
process their location, type, advantage/disadvantage to approach, etc. 
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Among the most efficient storage and retrieval codes, language is the newest input and 
processing medium for humans following vision by as much as 300 million years or more.  We 
transfer images that we see into verbal codes which is what we remember; in other words, a form 
of compression (Sternberg, 2003).  Language is also a way to allow items to exit our memory by 
attaching the meaning one word to other words through association.   
The development of information input evolutionarily also mimics the human fetus 
development through life.  The fetus is able to hear sounds in utero, and slowly begins to develop 
its vision once it is exposed to the outside world.  Language, however, is a late accomplishment 
developmentally.  Humans do not develop language skills until around the age of 18 months. 
Due to these developmental and evolutionary processes, one would expect to see language as 
being the newest way to process information.  Therefore this information should be more 
difficult to recall, even if that threat is more severe.  However, there is the possibility that 
severity of threat trumps every other factor, and therefore the memories that are of the highest 
threat should be better remembered. 
One would expect to see the equal prevalence of pain and visual input, or maybe pain over 
visual, to overpower verbal input.  The parallel to this idea in the current study is demonstrated 
by the car accident participants.  These participants had the pain and visual input mechanisms 
that allowed them to reach the same level of arousal and narrative detail as cancer diagnosis 
patients who utilized their language input mechanism.  However, pain and visual input 
participants did not significantly differ in their vividness ratings.  Again, this lack of difference 
reverts back to the fact that both pain and vision and older evolutionarily, whereas language is 
fairly new.  In conclusion, this hypothesis was shown to be false. 
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Threat to Self versus Other 
 Memory is used to remember the past, anticipate future events and interpret them 
accordingly (Otgaar & Howe, 2014).  Although memory may not be perfectly accurate, it helped 
us navigate the world with better proficiency (Otgarr & Howe, 2014).  Just like any other 
biological system, memory evolved to enhance survival and reproduction (Nairne et al., 2009).  
Natural selection has also affected memory evolution because it enhanced fitness in specific 
environments (Bowlby, 1969; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  Processing information with regard to 
survival has been shown to enhance long-term memory (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; 
Kang & McDermott, 2008).  Nairne, et al. (2007) assumed that memory has become adapted to 
help humans resolve reproduction and survival problems. 
 Prior work in adaptive memory used imagined threats to the rememberer to stimulate 
putative adaptive memory circuits (Howe & Otgaar, 2014).  Subjects were asked imagine being 
on a savannah without food water or weapons and rate words for their survival value.  This 
approach showed reliable, albeit small, enhancements to recall of the word lists.  What the 
experimental approach lacked was a parallel to real world experience and survival processing not 
related to the participants themselves.  Threats to one’s children are certainly fitness critical and 
when parents see their child injured, their event recall is almost as detailed as the recollection of 
the injured children themselves (Atkinson & Bohannon, 2013).  Henry, et al. (2000) found 
children recalled more details about the death of their parent than the death of their best friend’s 
parent.  Clearly, the passing of a parent in an altricial species like humans has huge survival 
(fitness) consequences for the deceased parent’s offspring and is well recalled despite not being a 
direct threat to the self.  The current study offers supporting evidence for this idea.  Affect 
ratings were higher for both parents who heard about and saw their child’s injury when 
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compared to the children’s affect.  In addition, parents who viewed their child’s injury had more 
vivid memories than cancer diagnoses.   
Parents who viewed their child’s injury had the same level of free recall detail as the 
child victim.  In addition, these parents also had more extensive free recall narratives than car 
accident participants.  Only in the probed responses, did child injury victims exceed their parents 
in memory quantity (See Table 1).  All parents, child victims and cancer diagnosis patients were 
equally confident in their probed memory.  The interaction between threat (self versus other) and 
affect group (calm, moderate, upset) demonstrated that parents had a significant increase in free 
recall detail ratings, probed response confidence, and vividness ratings (See Figure 1, Figure 2, 
and Figure 3). 
 Not only were parents evolutionarily tuned into threats towards their off spring, but 
children are also programmed early on to recognize survival threats.  Otgaar & Smeets (2010), 
found both younger (4-8) and older (9-11) children have been shown to display fitness-relevant 
memory processing.  Otgaar & Howe (2014) concluded that natural selection exerts a significant 
pressure during childhood, and these pressures should be apparent in memory related to survival 
cues.  In the current study, the injury acted as a survival cue because it involved a hospital trip 
and medical intervention. 
Childhood injury memories were found to have more recounts than car accident 
memories, and were more vivid than cancer diagnosis memories.  In addition, these memories 
were slightly more detailed than car accident memories in the free recall narratives.  Among 
other events, childhood injury memories had the highest confidence in the probed recall 
responses.  Even though this is only one type of survival threat during childhood, it provides 
further evidence that memory evolutionary mechanisms exist early on.   
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Vividness and Confidence 
 A flashbulb event reliably enhances measures of memory quality like vividness and 
confidence (Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  In fact, the association of vividness with belief in memory 
accuracy is fairly common (Neisser, 1982; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Weaver, 1993; Schmolck et 
al., 2000).  Vividness and confidence may correlate within each event within SS whereas the 
means across events do not show a correlation.  In contrast to these findings, the current results 
found no link between vividness and confidence. Childhood injury memories which were found 
to have the highest confidence ratings, yet only had a moderate vividness rating when compared 
to the other four events.  Cancer diagnosis memories and parent’s memories had the same 
confidence ratings, yet cancer diagnosis patient’s had the lowest vividness ratings.  Finally, 
whereas cancer diagnosis memories had the highest vividness ratings, they had the lowest 
confidence ratings.  These results point to vividness and confidence being two separate 
characteristics of flashbulb memories, instead of symptoms of the same memory quality 
mechanism. 
Another memory modulator is affect.  Measures of initial affective arousal have been 
correlated with the belief that the memory is accurate (Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  Habermas and 
Diel (2013) also demonstrated that emotionality was an excellent predictor of memory vividness.  
Interestingly, recent research found specific genetic polymorphisms that may positively 
influence both cognition and affective processes that allow greater emotional memory capacity 
(Todd et al., 2011).  Using the modulation hypothesis as a foundation, the Endophenotypic 
Model of Emotional Memory (EMEM) proposed that humans who have increased perceptual 
vividness at encoding are more likely to have more extensive and vivid memory.   Todd et al. 
(2011) suggested that this enhancement at encoding interacts with the effects of arousal 
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enhancing consolidation.  The EMEM model holds that salient events elicit enhanced attention as 
well as arousal-enhanced memory consolidation processes (Todd et al., 2011).  This enhanced 
perceptual experience may be linked to the amygdala’s enhancing effect on the visual cortex for 
emotional images (Bradley et al., 2003; Padmala & Pessoa, 2008), and also modulates memory 
(Cahill & Anderson, 2009). 
In contrast to these findings, the current results found no link between vividness and 
confidence.  Whereas cancer diagnosis memories had the highest affect, they had the lowest 
vividness and moderate confidence when compared to the other four events.  In addition to these 
findings, childhood injury memories had the lowest affect, yet they had the second highest 
vividness ratings and the highest confidence.  Overall, these conflicting findings need to be 
pursued further in order to determine the actual underlying mechanisms of how affect influences 
vividness and confidence.  However, the idea of actual physiological changes is intriguing 
evolutionary; perhaps our brains have come to evolve to better accommodate emotional 
memories so that cues to survival can be better encoded and more easily recalled. 
 
Yerkes Dodson Law 
 The brief improvement of memory processing in the hippocampus during times of stress 
or arousal enhances the declarative component of FBMs (Diamond et al., 2007).  This stress 
activation of the hippocampus causes a rapid and intense elevation of intracellular calcium, 
which leads to a quick enhancement (phase 1) (Diamond et al., 2007).  However after this brief 
time of hippocampal plasticity, a refractory period occurs; stimulation delivered during this time 
is less effective at inducing long-term processing (phase 2) (Diamond et al., 2007; Leider, 
Bohannon, & Sauer, 2012).  This change in charge within the cell creates an inverted “U” shape 
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which was initially found by Duffy (1957), who demonstrated that the relationship between 
activation and quality of performance was a moderate one.  Andreano & Cahill (2006) also found 
an inverted U pattern between cortisol levels and memory consolidation. 
 The question then becomes, if this relationship is true, should FBM even exist due to 
these memories being high in emotionality?  The answer is yes; extensive research shows that 
under certain conditions, high levels of emotionality can enhance memory (Ni, 1934; Cahill, 
Gorski, & Le, 2003; McGaugh, 2004; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004; Nielson, Yee, & 
Erickson, 2005).  Almost all FBMs are brief in nature, and therefore do no trigger the full shut 
down of the hippocampus.  The amygdala appears to remain in phase 1 longer than the 
hippocampus, which may be why the amygdala has such a crucial role in the consolidation of the 
emotional memory (Izquierdo & Medina, 1997; Pelletier & Pare, 2004; McGaugh, 2004).  In 
contrast, Kavushansky et al. (2006) found that emotional learning resulted in suppression of 
long-term processing in the amygdala.  These results are suggestive that just as the hippocampus, 
the amygdala as an initial activation phase which is followed by a slowly developing inhibitory 
phase. 
 In the current study when participants were broken down by affect group and vividness, 
the inverted “U” shape was demonstrated (See Figure 4).  This finding supports the concept that 
a moderate level of arousal helps participants enhance certain characteristics of memory.  In 
addition, cancer diagnosis memories were found to have the highest affect rating and the lowest 
vividness rating.  However, a conflicting finding was found with car accident memories.  These 
memories were second overall for affect, but were found to have the highest vividness.  Due to 
their affect rating being in the upper range, they should have had a moderate or lower vividness 
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rating.  It is a possibility that the method of information input could be playing a role in this 
relationship and should be further investigated. 
Further, parents who viewed their child’s injury were considered the “moderate” group 
with how they compared to the other events.  Therefore, one should assume that these memories 
had the most detail in the free recall narratives and probed recall responses because they should 
have been consolidated the best at encoding.  However, this was not the case.  Parents who 
viewed their child’s injury had the same amount of detail as childhood injury memories, and 
were also less detailed than cancer diagnosis memories.  This does not correspond with the 
Yerkes Dodson law, especially since cancer diagnosis memories had the highest affect whereas 
childhood injury memories had the lowest affect.  
In comparing the detail in the probed responses, one should assume that memories of 
parents who viewed their child’s injury had the most detail due to their “moderate” affect.  
Again, as with the free recall narratives, this was not found to be the case.  These memories were 
only found to be more detailed in the probed responses than parents who heard about their 
child’s injury.  In addition, these memories did not significantly differ in probed response detail 
when compared to childhood injury memories (See Table 1). 
 
Limitations and Weaknesses 
The sample size of cancer patients collected (N = 44) was smaller than had been originally 
desired, yet large enough to provide statistically significant results that demonstrated mostly 
large effects.  In future studies or for replication, a larger sample size is recommended in order to 
increase power.  In addition, comparison between different types of cancers would be interesting 
to see how the severity and the anticipation of the duration of treatment would affect the 
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encoding characteristics.  One limitation with only being able to obtain participants from cancer 
support groups is that they were in a setting where they are encouraged to share their story with 
others and possibly a therapist.  In future studies, participants should be asked how many times 
they: recounted their diagnosis story outside of any type of therapy or support group and how 
many times they have recounted their diagnosis conversation in total. 
The patients who contacted the researcher were majority female, with only seven males 
composing part of the sample.  If there were any kind of gender effects within the cancer 
diagnosis sample, it is safe to say that they were not detected in part due to this female biased.  
Efforts were made to contact cancer support groups for prostate cancer patients with little 
response in return.  In future studies, efforts should be made to achieve a more gender balanced 
sample. 
 The current study recruited participants through three main methods which included: 
Butler SONA systems, in class advertisements, and dispersing posters to cancer support group 
meeting places on a national level.  However, due to the sensitive topic, this recruitment process 
needed to be approached with confidentiality and empathy in mind.  Financial compensation was 
used to increase participation which originally increased numbers in the beginning of the study, 
but the number of participants who contacted the researcher eventually dwindled out. 
 
Conclusions 
 The analysis of the five event conditions demonstrated that the information input method, 
affect at the time of encoding, number of recounts, and perceived consequentiality/threat of the 
situation significantly affect memory quantity.  The low vividness demonstrated by cancer 
diagnosis memories in comparison to the other event’s vividness ratings demonstrates the 
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importance of whether the threat is directed at the self or another, and how the information is 
actively delivered during the event.  These results show how these factors have the potential to 
impact memory quality.  Memory quality consists of the confidence in and vividness of the 
memory at the time of recall, while memory quantity consists of the level of detail in the free 
recall narratives and probed responses (Talarico, LeBar, & Rubin, 2004).  Even though the 
threats of a car accident and childhood injury are delivered through the oldest evolutionary 
mechanisms of pain and vision, the threat of a cancer diagnosis through language was shown to 
trump both of these events in memory quantity.  From these findings, we can assume that the 
perceived consequentiality of the event is more important than the input mechanism when it 
comes to the quantity of the memory as assessed by the level of detail in free recall narratives.  
However, it is also important to note that cancer diagnosis and car accident memories did not 
differ in the level of detail that was contained in the probed recall responses.  Even though cancer 
diagnosis and car accident memories did not significantly differ from each other in their affect 
ratings, cancer diagnosis memories still came out on top with memory quantity. 
 In closing, this study is important because it demonstrates how different factors affect 
memory recall across varying event conditions.  It provides insight into how the presence and 
absence or degrees of certain features like vividness, affect, consequentiality, and rehearsals can 
have on memory recall. For instance, knowing that the method of information input and 
perceived threat affect the quality of memory can benefit us as humans to better understand what 
is going on with memory on an evolutionary level. 
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Figure 1. Line graph of ANOVA for free recall results dependent on victim status and affect 
group 
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Figure 2. Line graph of ANOVA for probe response confidence dependent on victim status and 
affect group 
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Figure 3. Line graph of ANOVA for vividness rating dependent on victim status and affect group 
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Figure 4. Means of vividness based on affect group which demonstrate an inverted “U” 
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Figure 5. Bar graph of ANOVA for number of recounts dependent on information type 
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Figure 6. Bar graph of ANOVA for vividness ratings dependent on information type 
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Appendix 1. Statement of Informed Consent 
Statement of Informed Consent 
 
I have read the below statement, understand my rights, and agree to these conditions. 
 
Name  Signature  
Date  Address  
City, State  Zip code  
Telephone    
 
Current Age: _____ 
 
Male: _____  Female: _____ (please check) 
 
 
Please keep a copy of this document, or detach below the line for your personal records. 
 
This study examines people’s memories for the discovery of their cancer diagnosis.  The responses will be 
kept confidential and will be used only for the purpose of this experiment.  Once the completed document is 
received, this informed consent will be separated from the rest of the protocol so that your personal information and 
medical information will no longer be associated with one another.  You’re authorization to use your medical 
information will not expire, but the separation of the two documents is guaranteed to insure confidentiality. Not even 
the researchers will be able to have the ability to make a connection between the separated documents.  Group 
averages and tendencies will be analyzed with a code for each subject maintaining the anonymity of all individual 
memories. 
To take part in the experiment you will fill out a questionnaire that should take approximately 20-40 
minutes. Participation in this study is voluntary and you will not be penalized or lose any previously entitled benefits 
should you choose not to participate.  You may also discontinue your participation in this experiment at any time, 
and any information that you provided will not be used.  It should be noted that e-mail communication of personal 
information has the possibility of breaching confidentiality.  However, all access to my personal e-mail account, 
both via computer and smart phone, is password protected.  Both my computer and phone require an unlock 
password to open the system, and then an additional password to access my e-mail.  Within a week of the e-mail 
being received, it will be printed and locked in a secure drawer in a locked office, and the e-mail will be 
permanently deleted from my account.  If you feel uncomfortable with e-mail communication, you may print and 
mail back the completed protocol at the following address: 
 Angeline Modesti 
 Butler University-Department of Psychology 
 Jordon Hall - 282 
4600 Sunset Ave. 
Indianapolis, IN 46208 
Please do not discuss this study with anyone during or after the experiment.  At your request, we will fully 
inform you as to the nature of this experiment no later than one month from your participation. 
 
If you have any questions please feel free to contact: 
 
Angeline Modesti 773.416.7497 
amodesti@butler.edu 
 
Dr. John N. Bohannon 317.940.9240 
nbohanno@butler.edu 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
Participant Number (leave blank): #________ 
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Appendix 2. Protocol 
Part 1: Learning of your Cancer Diagnosis 
 
Free Recall 
 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THE PAGE UNTIL THE CURRENT PAGE IS COMPLETE 
 
Please write a detailed account of when you first heard of your cancer diagnosis as if you were witnessing 
the event as someone other than yourself. Please be as accurate as possible and include all of the vivid 
details surrounding your learning of your diagnosis.  After you have completed this section, please do 
NOT return to edit or change any part of your narrative.  Please use the area provided below for your 
response. 
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Questionnaire 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about the time when you first learned that you had a cancer 
diagnosis. 
 
1. How old were you at the time you learned of your cancer diagnosis? _________________ 
 
2. Please rate how expected the diagnosis was on the 5-point scale provided below. Circle the number you 
feel best fits. 
 
1   2   3   4   5 
Not           Average        Completely 
Expected               Expected 
    
 
3.  Please rate how aroused you were upon learning of the diagnosis on the 5-point scale provided below. 
Circle the number you feel best fits. 
 
1   2   3   4   5 
Not Upset       Moderately                    Completely 
        Upset 
 
4.  Please rate how threatening was your diagnosis was on the 5-point scale provided below.  Circle the 
number you feel best fits. 
 
1   2   3   4   5 
Not Threatening         Moderately                                       Extremely Threatening 
 
5.  Please rate how vivid you memory is of your diagnosis on the 5-point scale provided below.  Highlight 
the number you feel best fits. 
 
1                      2                       3                       4                      5 
Not Aroused        Moderately         Extremely Aroused 
 
 
6.  How frequently do talk about or share this diagnosis with others? Please give a specific number.  
 
___________ 
7.  How many times have you recalled your diagnosis?  Please give a specific number. __________ 
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Probed Responses 
 
The following questions concern the events, people, and conditions surrounding the instant you first heard 
about your cancer diagnosis. In addition, please use the scale below to rate your confidence in the answer 
to each question.  If you do not know the answer, simply leave it blank and rate your confidence as a ‘1’. 
 
Not sure at all 
Somewhat 
Confident 
Moderately  
Confident 
Very Confident Absolutely 
Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.  What were you wearing at the time you learned of your diagnosis?               Confidence Rating _____ 
 
8.  What was the exact date that you learned of your diagnosis? (month/date/year- if possible)  
         Confidence Rating _____ 
9.  What day of the week did you learn of your diagnosis?             Confidence Rating _____  
 
10.  What time did you learn of your diagnosis? (to the nearest hour, AM or PM)     
         Confidence Rating _____ 
 
11.  Who informed you of your diagnosis?                         Confidence Rating _____ 
 
12.  What was the person who informed you of your diagnosis wearing when they told you? 
         Confidence Rating _____ 
13.  What exactly did the person who informed you of your diagnosis say to you?    (Be as specific as 
possible)   
                      Confidence Rating _____ 
14.  How did you learn of your diagnosis? (ie: over the phone, in person from another person, etc.) 
         Confidence Rating _____ 
15.  Where were you when you learned of your diagnosis? (As closely as you can recall- 
 e.g. on the couch in the living room, at the Dr.’s office etc.)                       Confidence Rating _____ 
 
16.  What was the weather like at the time you learned of your diagnosis?         Confidence Rating _____ 
 
17.  Did you have prior knowledge that you might possibly have a serious medical condition?  If so, what 
symptoms were you having?                 Confidence Rating _____ 
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Cancer Outcome Probe 
 
Please answer the following questions specifically and to the best of your ability.  Feel free to include 
internal feelings at any point as well. 
  
After your diagnosis, did you have to get extra support from your friends and family, and if so, what? 
 
 
Did you receive any medication besides chemotherapy? If so, how did it affect you?  
 
 
After the diagnosis took place, how did you feel? 
  
 
Has your diagnosis change how you lived your daily life? If so, please explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE END 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix 3. Event breakdown for comparison analysis 
 
Event Stimulus Type Threat Directed At Severity 
Cancer Diagnosis Language Self High 
Car Accident Pain/Visual Self Moderate 
Childhood Injury Pain/Visual Self High 
Childhood Injury Parent Present Visual Other Moderate 
Childhood Injury Parent Not 
Present 
Language Other Moderate 
 
Appendix 4. Canonical Features 
 
Recall Canonical Feature Description Quantity Score 
Activity Subject’s activity leading to the 
event 
0-3/3 
Location Subject’s location when the event 
took place 
0-3/3 
Time Time when the event took place 0-3/3 
Author’s Affect The emotional state of the subject 
after the event 
0-3/3 
Aftermath Any action that occurred after the 
event 
0-3/3 
Others Present Anyone around subject during the 
event 
0-3/3 
Others Affect Emotional state of any others after 
the event 
0-3/3 
 
Appendix 5. Scoring canonical feature guidelines for free recall portion of protocol 
 
Free Response Scoring Rules: Cancer Diagnosis 
 
Activity = (Activity of the narrator – that occurs within a few minutes before the diagnosis) 
 
0 There is no activity mentioned or implied. 
 
1 Any amount of activity is (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated but vague:  the scorer CANNOT 
physically imitate the activity of the narrator without any doubt.  
2 One activity is (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer CAN physically imitate the activity of the 
narrator without any doubt.  
3 Two or more activities are (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer CAN physically imitate the 
activity without any doubt. 
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Location = (Location at which the diagnosis occurred) 
0 There is no location mentioned or implied. 
1 Any amount of location is (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated and within an area greater than 100 
feet. 
2 One location is (3) explicitly stated and within an area of 100 feet.  
3 Two or more locations are (3) explicitly stated and within an area of 100 feet.  
 
Time = (Time at which the diagnosis occurred)  
0 There is no time given or implied. 
1 Any amount of time is (1) implied OR (2) relative to another event OR (3) explicitly stated and 
greater than one day. 
(1)  (“I was eating breakfast…” implies morning, “In the dark” “Just got home from work” ) 
(2)  (“it was April” “during the Summer” “Two years ago” Near Halloween” ) 
2 One time is (4) explicitly stated and less than or equal to a day. 
(4)  (“It was 10:45” “morning” “Friday”  “New Years Eve” “October 3rd” “that night”) 
3 Two or more times are (4) explicitly stated and less than or equal to a day. 
 
 
Others Present = (People or collectives  around the narrator – that are present within a few minutes before 
the diagnosis, during the diagnosis, or within a few minutes after the diagnosis. This should NOT include the 
doctor ) 
 
0 There are no other’s present mentioned or implied. 
1 Any amount of people or collectives are (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated, but the narrator most 
likely wouldn’t be able to pick the person/collective out of a lineup. 
1)  (“We were in the doctors office) 
2)  (“People were talking” “Someone” “Surrounded by friends”) 
2 One person or collective is (3) explicitly stated, and the narrator most likely would be able to pick the 
person/collective out of a lineup OR (4) there is a specifically stated lack of others present. 
(3)  (“my best friend” “Jessica” “wife” “husband” “Josh was talking” “Mom” “Dad”) 
(4)  (“I was completely alone”) 
3 Two or more people or collectives are  (3) explicitly stated, and the narrator most likely would be 
able to pick the person/collective out of a lineup.  
 
Author’s Affect = (Mental state of the narrator – that is experienced within a few minutes before the 
diagnosis, during the diagnosis, or within a few minutes after the diagnosis) 
 
0 There is no author’s affect mentioned or implied.  
1 Any amount of author’s affect is (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated but vague:  the scorer cannot 
mentally imitate the emotion without a doubt. 
(1)  by the description of thoughts (“Couldn’t believe it”  “Thinking is this really happening?” ) by 
the description of the diagnosis (“It was awkward” “it was weird” by action (“Freaking out” 
“Cried”)  
(2)  (“Felt so many feelings at once” “Felt like I Could cry” “was Dying inside”) 
2 One author’s affect is (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer can mentally imitate the emotion 
without a doubt. 
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(3)  (“I was shocked” “I felt awkward” “I was scared” “I was breathless” “Heart was racing” “felt 
relieved”) 
3 Two or more author’s affects are (3) explicitly stated and the scorer can mentally imitate the emotion 
without a doubt. 
 
Others’ Affect = (Mental state of people around the narrator -- that is experienced within a few minutes 
before the diagnosis, during the diagnosis, or within a few minutes after the diagnosis) 
 
0 There is no other’s affect mentioned or implied. 
1 Any amount of other’s affect is (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated but vague:  the scorer cannot 
mentally imitate the emotion without a doubt. 
(1)  by the description of thoughts (“Couldn’t believe it” “Thinking is this really happening?”) by 
the description of the diagnosis (“It was awkward” “it was Weird”) by action (“Laughed” 
“Freaking out” “Cried”)  
(2)  (“Felt so many feelings at once” “Felt like I Could cry” “Felt a Rush” “was Dying inside”) 
2 One other’s affect is (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer can mentally imitate the emotion 
without a doubt. 
(3)  (“I was shocked” “I felt awkward” “I was scared” “I was Breathless” “Heart was racing” “felt 
relieved”) 
3 Two or more other’s affects are (3) explicitly stated and the scorer can mentally imitate the emotion 
without a doubt. 
 
Aftermath = (Activity of the narrator -- that occurs within a few minutes after the diagnosis) 
 
0 There is no activity mentioned or implied. 
1 Any amount of activity is (1) implied OR (2) explicitly stated but vague:  the scorer CANNOT 
physically imitate the activity of the narrator without any doubt.  
(1)  (“at dinner” implies eating…“I was on my way to work…” implies walking or driving… “After a 
movie” implies watching 
(2)  (“I went,” “I arrived” “I was hanging out at my house” “I pulled up to my driveway” “I 
dropped him off”  “I joined the group”) 
 
2 One activity is (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer CAN physically imitate the activity of the 
narrator without any doubt.  
(3)  (“We were walking” “I was eating” “We were standing” “ We drove back” “I got in my car” “I 
asked” “I said” “waiting”) 
3 Two or more activities are (3) explicitly stated and specific:  the scorer CAN physically imitate the 
activity without any doubt. 
 
Appendix 6. Probe Responses 
 
Probe Description Quantity Score 
What were you wearing Subject’s clothing at the time of the diagnosis 0-2/2 
Exact date Date of diagnosis (month, day, year) 0-2/2 
Day of the week Day of the week the diagnosis was given 0-2/2 
Time of day Time of day that the diagnosis was given 0-2/2 
Informant’s name Name of the person that informed the subject 
about diagnosis 
0-2/2 
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What was your informant 
wearing 
Informant’s clothing at the time of the 
diagnosis 
0-2/2 
What did your informant tell 
you about your diagnosis 
Information the informant gave the subject 
when the diagnosis was revealed 
0-2/2 
How did you learn about 
your diagnosis 
Medium of communication 0-2/2 
What location Where the subject was when the diagnosis was 
given 
0-2/2 
Weather What the weather was like when the day the 
diagnosis was given 
0-2/2 
What kind of support did you 
receive 
Amount of support received by subject after 
the diagnosis was given 
0-2/2 
 
Appendix 7. Scoring guideline for probing questions portion of protocol 
 
Cancer Probed Response Scoring Rules  
What were you wearing: 
0 No answer is given. (“clothes”) 
1 One article of clothing is stated (“Jeans” “Hoodie”) or an outfit is vaguely mentioned. (“shorts and 
a shirt” “nothing” “track uniform”) Guess is made. (“Maybe jeans”) Single brand name without 
clothing article. (Under Armor”) 
2 Outfit is explicitly explained with specific descriptor/color (“Jean skirt and a black tank top” 
“favorite pair of basketball shorts” “Hollister shirt”) 
 
Exact date: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 One aspect of the date is given. (“July” “Monday”) Day is missing. (“September 2008”) 
2 The entire, specific date is given. (“April 21, 2006”) 
 
Day of week: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 Vague answer is given. (“Middle of the week” “Over the weekend” “Monday or Tuesday”) 
2 Exact day is given. (“Tuesday”) 
 
Time of day: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 General time of the day is given. (“Morning” “Late afternoon”) Time span. (“Between 1:30-2:30” 
“≈/approximately”) 
2 Specific time is explicitly stated. (“2:00 PM” “11:47 in the morning”) 
 
Informant’s name: 
0 No name is given. 
1 One name is given (“Kyle” “Smith”) or reference is made (“Some girl I met at a party”) 
2 Full name is given (“Cindy Patterson”) Answer is definitely known, but withheld. (“I truly know, but 
choose not to answer”) Type of specialty of the doctor is provided (“Radiologist” “Oncologist”) 
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What was your informant wearing: 
0 No answer is given. (“clothes”) 
1 One article of clothing is stated (“Jeans”) or an outfit is vaguely mentioned (“shorts and a shirt”) 
2 Outfit is explicitly explained with specific descriptor/color (“dress pants and a button up shirt with 
tie”) 
 
What did your Informant tell you about your diagnosis: 
0 No answer is given.  
1 You have cancer and no other details mentioned 
2 Diagnosis is explained further or explained in more detail. Tests are mentioned, medication, support 
groups available, etc.  
 
How did you learn of your diagnosis: 
0 No answer is given.  
1 One answer is given. In person, over the phone, an email etc 
2 Specific details are mentioned about the learning of the diagnosis 
 
What location: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 Implied or vague answer, cannot be pinpointed to a specific place within 10 feet. (“outside”) Single 
specific place. (“My kitchen” “In the office” “bed”) 
2 More than one location is mentioned, or an explicit is further specified within 10 feet. (“In his office 
on the examining table” “in the ER on the hospital bed”) 
 
Prior Knowledge: 
0 No answer given 
1 Implied or vague indication, cannot be pinpointed to one specific symptom 
2 More than one indication is mentioned, or an explicit idea is further elaborated upon 
 
Weather:  
0 No answer is given. 
1 General temperature is given, or two vague answers. (“Chilly” “Warm” “70’s”) 
2 Specific weather condition is explicitly stated (“The sun was beating down” “overcast” “fog” 
”clear” “humid”) Vague condition is further explained. Use of ing/ny (“sunny” “snowing”) 
 
Support: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 No or NA 
2 More than one help devise is mentioned.  
 
Medication NOT including chemotherapy agents: 
0  No medication  
1 Yes medication but no way of how it affected the person  
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2 More than one affect is mentioned, or a medication is named and side effects elaborated on 
 
Burden/Relief: 
0 No answer is given. 
1 Implied or vague answer. It didn’t really affect me. Or a little amount of affect was shown. (“I was a 
little relieved/upset”)  
2 Feeling is explained showing high affect ( “I was greatly upset/relieved”)  
 
Other Changes: 
0 No answer is given or no changes were mentioned  
1 One change ,  “I feel more insecure”  
2 More than one change is mentioned, or an explicit is further specified.  
 
